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RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8918
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2915
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 9919
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0073
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1641
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 LIMA 000176

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS, WHA, OES
BRASILIA FOR ESTH HUB JSTORY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [AMED](#) [KFLO](#) [AEMR](#) [TBIO](#) [PE](#)
SUBJECT: EMBASSY LIMA AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES

REF: STATE 219189

¶1. Summary: (SBU) Embassy Lima's EAC approved tripwires and Embassy responses prepared by its Avian Influenza Working Group (AIWG). Post has taken or has in process the Department's recommended immediate preparedness measures. The AIWG has agreed that efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission, anywhere in the world, and any cases of human AI in Peru, will be key tripwire events in an AI pandemic. Adequate medical care would not be available in Lima in the event of a Pandemic. Post recommends serious consideration of authorized departure after the earliest tripwires, but has kept its action plan flexible. Despite limitations in GOP capability, the medical and avian expertise at post will enable it to make rapid and appropriate judgments. End Summary.

SITUATION IN PERU

¶2. (SBU) Peru's hospitals will be completely overwhelmed in the event of Pandemic Influenza. Peru is a medically austere post, with no large sophisticated hospitals as are found in Colombia, Chile, Argentina or Brazil. The Regional Medical Officer (RMO) at post recommends hospitalization only at several small private hospitals in Lima. There are perhaps 30 adequate intensive care beds in Lima, with around 20 ventilators, all of which would be unavailable in a pandemic.

¶3. (SBU) Post may be able to shelter in place for 3 to 4 weeks, but two weeks is a more realistic maximum. Civil disorder and food and other commodities disruption, as well as an inability to medically care for the sickest patients, would probably produce a calamity for post should we shelter in place. RMO feels that the health and safety of our personnel would be best served by an authorized departure from Peru immediately after the WHO declares the start of a pandemic anywhere in the world.

AVIAN INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP

¶4. (U) The Embassy Lima Avian Influenza (AI) Working Group (AIWG) has met and discussed immediate actions, potential tripwires and possible Embassy activities in response to these tripwires. Participants on the AIWG include representatives from the Health Unit (HU)/Regional Medical Officer, the Naval Medical Research Center Detachment

(NMRCDC), USAID, Consular (CON), RSO, MAO, ECON, FAS and PAO. Many AIWG members are also on the Emergency Action Committee. Other sections with assets that could be used to deal with an outbreak, such as Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and DEA were consulted.

¶5. (U) Despite limitations in GOP and private medical capability, the medical/health and avian expertise at post represented by NMRCDC, FAS, RMO and USAID will enable the AIWG to make rapid and appropriate judgments to confirm tripwires and responses. For this reason tripwire responses contain maximum flexibility, with most situations calling for consideration of authorized or ordered departure requests.

TRIPWIRES AND RESPONSES

¶6. (U) The AIWG agreed that the key tripwire event in a Pandemic Influenza outbreak among humans is the following: "Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission." Once this tripwire is met, it will trigger a series of immediate Embassy activities (as listed under tripwires five and six below). The medical experts on the AIWG advised that if an efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission should emerge, it will become fairly obvious within one or two weeks, with many people contracting influenza, including health care workers taking care of patients.

¶7. (U) Other tripwires warrant attention, as they could indicate a change in the nature of the virus, but not to the

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extent of an efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission. These tripwires are the following: "A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases" and "Sustained human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact." Specific scenarios also have been discussed and actions recommended below, but within the context of the broader tripwires.

¶8. (U) The AIWG agreed that the location of a tripwire event - in a neighboring country, in a rural or isolated section of the home country, or near or within the city where the Embassy or other USG facility is located - is an important factor to consider. Parts of Peru, including Iquitos, are accessible only by air or river boat. Iquitos has a substantial USG presence (NMRCDC staff and frequent visitors from other agencies); other towns east of the Andes such as Pucallpa have fairly constant USG official presence. Communications regarding AI would include the Consular Agent in Cuzco as appropriate. Our Peace Corps volunteers (PCV) are grouped in certain areas, most of them isolated.

¶9. (U) These tripwires are based on assumptions that should sustained human-to-human transmission become a reality:

- The disease could spread rapidly, both within a particular country and internationally.
- Once the World Health Organization has declared that a human pandemic has started, travel by commercial aviation will become limited as countries react to control the spread of the disease.
- An effective human vaccine will still not be available.
- Availability of effective therapy will be limited.
- Public reaction to an outbreak, even solely among poultry, could be fueled by sensational media reporting and a proclivity for mass demonstrations, causing a public reaction out of proportion to the situation and making GOP and the Embassy's response more difficult.
- Embassy personnel and dependants will want to return to the U.S. unless there is a significant PI outbreak there.
- It may nevertheless be medically safer for personnel to remain in Peru.
- Avoiding a double standard for non-official Americans, and

to what extent to include LES in AI/PI preparations, will require careful navigation.

- NMRCI-Iquitos, while primarily an entomology facility, will be the only laboratory in northern Peru capable of effecting testing for avian flu; it will probably remain operating where a peripheral USG facility might otherwise be closed so that employees could relocate to Lima.
- Timely and appropriate communications with the Mission's FSN staff will be key for an organized response to a pandemic.

¶10. (U) Any of the tripwires discussed below could occur independently of each other. It is also possible that two or more tripwires could occur sequentially or simultaneously. In the course of discussions, it was apparent that certain actions need to take place now, before any tripwires are met, in order to be fully prepared in advance.

¶11. (U) These tripwires are designed to stimulate maximum advance planning, to identify key events that will require rapid response to protect Post personnel and facilities, and to describe the (foreseeable) scope of issues that will need to be addressed under specific scenarios. At the same time, Post recognizes that real-time judgments will need to be based on actual data and factors present in the situation -- which may not be anticipated in this document.

¶12. (U) This report lists (A) actions that require immediate attention, (B) tripwires and responses, and (C) specific scenarios.

¶13. (U) (A) Actions to be taken immediately in preparation for an Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak in humans (Pandemic Influenza - PI):

- Provide Mission fact sheets for staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in Iquitos and other cities where Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) or other Mission employees

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are located. (Already done as part of EAP.)

- Mission prepares a drawdown list and a list of minimum emergency personnel. (Note: Emergency personnel in the context of an AI outbreak likely will be different from the usual list compiled by the EAC for other types of emergencies. The Mission will plan to retain more NMRCI, FAS, and USAID staff than are on the basic EAC drawdown list, and some persons on the current basic EAC list may not be essential for an AI outbreak.) (In Progress)

- Conduct inventory of supplies of Tamiflu and protective equipment, including gowns, gloves, protective eyewear, alcohol-based cleansers, and N95 respirators. (Done)

- Determine what more is needed and procure the additional needed supplies. Decide how to allocate Tamiflu, masks, and other equipment between Embassy Lima and NMRCI-Iquitos. (In progress)

- Advise family members to keep at least a 2-week supply of food and water at this time, as they should in the event of any unforeseen emergency occurring overseas. (Already done as part of EAP and Embassy community outreach.)

- Offices should evaluate mechanisms for conducting work from home or other locations under conditions of a pandemic requiring limiting access to Mission offices. (In progress.)

- Develop a contingency plan of action for directly supporting potential embassy evacuees from neighboring posts with limited medical resources. (Already done as part of EAP for dealing with political unrest causing evacuation from neighboring posts. Note: this is a low priority as Lima would not be an advisable evacuation point for neighboring

country U.S. Missions.)

- Prepare pre-planned packets - including travel orders to the extent possible - for potential Mission evacuees under an authorized departure, to avoid a last minute backlog. (Travel order requests are already on file for mission members per EAC SOP; Mission is working on preparation of draft travel orders.)
- Continue to monitor GOP ability to detect, contain and treat AI cases in birds and humans. (ECON, AID, NMRCD and FAS are doing this.)
- Meet with Roche Peru medical director to assess availability of Tamiflu in Lima. (ECON - in Progress)
- Involve Commissary Board in developing plan to stock appropriate items and how to transfer to members (and non-members, in emergency) without compromising financial integrity. (In progress)
- GSO to develop authorization for Embassy community to have increased number of filled water containers on hand. (In progress)
- Confirm secure location of Tamiflu and other essential materials. (Done)
- Hold Town Hall meeting, simultaneously using warden system to inform AmCit community. (Scheduled)

14. (U) (B) TRIPWIRES AND RESPONSES:

TRIPWIRE ZERO

Any human case of H5N1 influenza appearing in Peru, or human case of H7N7 (or other avian, or pandemic flu), presumably transmitted from birds or other animals, appears in Peru, without evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission. (Note: despite lack of clear danger of PI, Embassy and Peruvian public concern will be high.)

- AIWG meets to confirm tripwire. NMRCD-Iquitos participates by telephone.

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- Restrict official and unofficial travel to affected areas, bird markets and similar facilities. (exception below)
- Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel and warden message to private American citizens, and post the warning announcement on the Embassy website. Prepare talking points for domestic and international press.
- Provide detailed briefing to Embassy staff. Communicate pertinent information to the Embassy community by way of venues such as town hall meetings, the embassy web site and newsletter articles. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Consider sending NMRCD or USAID expert to area to verify situation.
- ECON, FAS, NMRCD contact key GOP agency contacts to assess situation. These agencies include:
 - SENASA (Min. of Ag. Animal Inspection Service) (FAS, ECON)
 - Min. of Health (NMRCD, USAID, ECON)
 - INDECI (Disaster/Civil Defense Agency)(MAAG, USAID, ECON)
 - Defense Ministry (MAAG, DAO)- Police (Ministry of Interior) (RSO)

¶15. (U) TRIPWIRE ONE

A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact in a neighboring country in South America (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil), but not in Peru. Consider this tripwire if situation occurs in an Asian country with which Peru has extensive trade, such as China. This is particularly significant if there are multiple, geographically diverse clusters, or if a cluster occurs in a major transit hub. (No efficient and sustained human-to-human cases.)

- AIWG meets to confirm tripwire. NMRCD-Iquitos participates by telephone.
- Restrict travel to the affected country or affected areas within the country, except for NMRCD, FAS, or other personnel involved in possible investigation/containment efforts. (No restrictions on these personnel returning to Lima.)
- Coordinate with U.S. Mission in the affected country regarding that Mission's plans for possible public announcements, warden messages, or plans for evacuating personnel.
- Provide Mission fact sheet or briefings for staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in other USG facilities as appropriate.
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Ensure that any public announcements or travel warnings issued by neighboring posts are transmitted to American citizens (AmCits) in Peru; publish the updates on the Consular Section's web site. Consider a public announcement to private American citizens.
- Consider requesting authorized departure of U.S. family members and non-emergency personnel. Have evacuation plans for both the well and ill.
- Institute screening practices for all visitors to U.S. Government facilities and consider limiting visitor numbers.
- Consider mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any influenza (flu)-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like symptoms. Information will be disseminated regarding the details of flu symptoms. Monitoring by the

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Health Unit.

- Consider use of prophylactic oseltamivir (Tamiflu) by U.S. and LES staff in positions that require frequent contact with the public.

¶16. (U) TRIPWIRE TWO

A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact in rural Peru or in an isolated section of Peru, but not in Lima. (No efficient human-to-human cases.)

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCD-Iquitos participates.
- Restrict travel to the affected region(s) of the country except for NMRCD, FAS, or other personnel involved in possible investigation/containment efforts. (No restrictions on these personnel returning to Lima.)
- In coordination with the Dept, issue public announcement,

warden message, or travel warning and update website cautioning American citizens against nonessential travel to the affected region(s). Provide press guidance for the potential use of the Mission, neighboring posts, the Department and concerned government agencies.

- Provide Mission fact sheet and schedule briefings for staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and other USG facilities as appropriate. Fact sheet would detail the episode(s) and suggest means of disease prevention. The notice will also be posted on the Embassy website. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.

- Consider reduction to emergency consular services only.

- Consider requesting authorized departure. Consider requesting ordered departure. Consider implementing selective administrative leave for those Americans who remain at post, and LES employees. Consider other options for minimizing workplace exposure, like telecommuting.

- Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like symptoms.

- Consider home quarantine and limiting venues of human-to-human contact, such as community gatherings.

- Consider screening of all visitors to the chancery and other USG facilities, and recommend use of protective gear, especially surgical masks, to those with frequent contact with visitors. (Note: Due to limited supply of N95 masks and lack of necessity for their use at this time, the N95 would not be required.)

- Health Unit to initiate appropriate use of prophylactic oseltamivir (Tamiflu) by minimal U.S. and LES staff remaining on the job.

17. (U) TRIPWIRE THREE

A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact near or within Iquitos, Pucallpa, or other NAS facilities.

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCI-Iquitos participates.

- Town meetings are held and fact sheets distributed. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.

- Restrict travel to affected areas except for NMRCI, FAS, or other personnel involved in possible investigation/containment efforts. (No restrictions on these personnel returning to Lima.)

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- In coordination with the State Department, issue public announcement, warden message, or travel warning and update website advising American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to affected areas. Prepare press guidance and issue press release outlining the new guidance. Coordinate public affairs and media activities with NMRCI-Iquitos.

- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI infection.

- Embassy Lima maintains operations, but maintains close monitoring.

- Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates closely with NMRCI-Iquitos and other USG facilities to

determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop.
Next steps could include the following:

- Close NAS or other USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce NMRCD-Iquitos to minimal staff, and reduce services and operations to emergency Consular services and other designated services and operations.
- Consider authorized departure of dependents. Authorized departure of non-emergency staff. (Note: In deciding whether to authorize departure, the EAC should take into account not only the medical risk, which may be minimal, but also the perceived risk by employees and family members.)
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and water.
- Depending on level of public inquiries, embassy Lima establishes a call center for inquiries from American public and the press.

18. (U) TRIPWIRE FOUR

A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact near or within Lima. (still no efficient human-to-human transmission.)

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCD-Iquitos participates.
- Town meetings held and fact sheets distributed. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Cancel (deny Country Clearance for) incoming official travel to Peru, except for personnel involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as otherwise deemed necessary by COM.
- In coordination with the State Department, issue or revise warden message, and travel warning and update website urging all American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Peru. (Prepare press guidance and issue press release outlining the new guidance.) Coordinate public affairs and media activities with NMRCD-Iquitos.
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI infection.
- Embassy Lima maintains full service operations, but maintains close monitoring.
- Consular Section reduces visa appointments to a minimum to reduce risk of spreading disease within the Embassy and to make more staff available to provide emergency assistance to American citizens.
- Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG facilities to determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop.
Next steps could include the following:

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- Close USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce NMRCD-Iquitos to appropriate staffing level, and/or Embassy to minimal staff, reduce services and operations to emergency Consular services and other designated services and operations.
- Consider requesting authorized departure of dependents and non-emergency staff. (Note: In deciding whether to request authorized departure, the EAC should take into account not only the medical risk, which may be minimal, but also the perceived risk by employees and family members.)

- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, all others remain home (administrative leave) or on authorized departure.
- HU and designated EAC members meet with school administrators to review advisability of closing the schools.
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and water.
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict participating in sporting events, etc.).
- Depending on level of public inquiries, embassy Lima establishes a call center for inquiries from American public and the press.

19. (U) TRIPWIRE FIVE

Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission in a neighboring country in South America, or a country with which Peru has substantial trade in avian products, such as China.

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCI-Iquitos participates.
- Restrict travel to the affected country, except for NMRCI, FAS, or other personnel involved in possible investigation/containment efforts. (Note: Need to determine what type of quarantine/restrictions by GOP authorities may be placed on these personnel returning to Peru.)
- Coordinate with U.S. Mission in the affected country regarding that Mission's plans for possible evacuation of personnel to Lima. (Note: See Scenario One below.)
- Provide Mission briefings for staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in USG facilities outside of Lima. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- MED and designated EAC members meet with school administrators to review advisability of closing the schools.
- Embassy staffs and equips a situation room. Uses cleared press guidance.
- Maintain normal Consulate and Embassy operations, but maintain close monitoring.
- Embassy Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates closely with NMRCI-Iquitos and other USG facilities to determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop. Next steps could include:
 - Reduction to emergency CON services; suspension of some services.
 - Close USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce NMRCI-Iquitos and/or Embassy to appropriate staffing, and reduce services and operations to emergency Consular services and other designated services and operations.
 - Consider requesting authorized departure for dependents and non-emergency personnel. (Note: Authorized departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru

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restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.)

- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, all others remain home (administrative leave) or on

authorized departure; children remain home from school or on authorized departure.

- Ensure that staff purchases additional supplies of food and water.
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict participating in sporting events, etc.).

120. (U) TRIPWIRE SIX

Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission in an isolated section of Peru.

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCI-Iquitos participates in person or by telephone.
- Issue revised travel warning and update website advising American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Peru.
- Consider requesting authorized or ordered departure of dependents and non-emergency personnel. (Note: Authorized departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.)
- Cancel all incoming official travel, except for personnel involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as otherwise deemed necessary by COM.
- Provide Mission briefings for staff (American and FSN) and dependents and to school administrators at schools used by American staff in Lima; recommend schools close. AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Embassy and NMRCI-Iquitos at minimal staff, reduction to emergency Consular services, suspension of designated services and operations. Closure of other USG facilities such as NAS-supported bases. PCV are pulled back to Lima and stay with volunteer host families from Embassy Community.
- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, all others remain home (administrative leave) or on authorized departure; children remain home from school or on authorized departure.
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and water.
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict participating in sporting events, etc.).
- Split the Marine Security Guard detachment into two separate and independent units. (In the event individuals in one unit acquire the disease, the other unit can still ensure proper coverage of classified materials.)
- Restrict visitor access to Mission buildings. If entry into Mission buildings is necessary to conduct business, visitors must go through screening procedures to include temperature monitoring and/or questionnaire related to symptoms/exposure. (Note: There are no studies that provide verification regarding effectiveness of these procedures. They also will not identify people who are contagious but asymptomatic or have minimal symptoms. The level of restrictions on access to Mission facilities should depend on the particular circumstances at that moment.)
- Embassy staffs and equips a situation room and a call center for inquiries from American public and the press.

- Establish a database listing details of any American citizen, hospitalized, quarantined, or ill at home.
- HU closely monitors availability of medical/hospital facilities in Lima.
- MAO closely monitors availability of outgoing commercial flights.
- Embassy EAC meets regularly and coordinates closely with NMRC-D-Iquitos to determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop. Next steps could include:
 - Restrict/prohibit visitor access to internal Mission facility offices.
 - Reduction of staff at NMRC-D-Iquitos to those performing AI-related duties.
 - Consider ordered departure of non-emergency personnel and dependents with authorized departure of designated emergency personnel on a case-by-case basis. (Note: Ordered or authorized departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.)
 - Suspension of additional Embassy services and operations.
 - In coordination with the State Department, revise Travel Warning to add message advising Americans to leave Peru.
 - Update website and issue public announcements as necessary.
 - Per State 183776 (10/05/2005), prophylactic treatment with Tamiflu will be considered only for staff that are required to be in direct contact with potentially infected persons.
 - Assist in evacuation of private American nationals. (Note: Significant evacuation from Lima may not be feasible/advisable for a variety of reasons including the size of the post, limited availability of air transport, the potential and added risk of acquiring influenza at crowded airports or on long international flights during a true pandemic, travel restrictions and possible quarantine measures. Therefore, a complete evacuation of all Mission personnel and closure of Embassy Lima is not/not anticipated.)

21. (U) TRIPWIRE SEVEN

Efficient and Sustained human-to-human transmission, as evidenced by clusters of cases in Lima. This is particularly significant if there are multiple diverse clusters, or a cluster is not safely isolated.

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRC-D-Iquitos participates in person or by telephone.
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Order mandatory reduction to emergency consular services. Consider closing consular section.
- Implement ordered departure, if airlines are still servicing Lima.
- Implement administrative leave for non-emergency LES (FSNs). Consider other options for minimizing workplace exposure, like telecommuting.
- Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like symptoms.
- Screen all visitors to chancery and USG facilities, and use of protective gear, including N95 masks by those

employees with significant contact with the public.

- Initiate appropriate prophylactic use of oseltamivir

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(Tamiflu) by LES staff remaining on the job and by American employees and family members remaining at post.

- Issue public announcement to private American community.
- Consider shelter in place order by COM. Use Embassy warden system to maintain contact with employees.
- Implement drawdown of Embassy staff to AI/PI drawdown list; rest of Amcit staff are on administrative leave.

122. (U) TRIPWIRE EIGHT

Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission anywhere in the world. (Note: due to frequency of air travel between Lima and North America, Asia and Europe, Embassy would consider spread to Lima as probable.)

- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCD-Iquitos participates.
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives.
- Restrict travel to the affected country.
- Provide Mission fact sheet and town meeting for staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in USG facilities outside of Lima.
- Maintain normal Consulate and Embassy operations, but maintain close monitoring.
- Embassy Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG facilities to determine next steps as tripwires develop.
- Request authorized departure for dependents and non-emergency personnel. (Note: Authorized departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.) Prioritize departure for persons at high risk for medical complications of influenza.
- Ensure that staff purchases additional supplies of food and water.

123. (U) C. SPECIFIC SCENARIOS:

SCENARIO ONE

A neighboring post evacuates personnel to Lima. (Note: this scenario is unlikely as Lima is not an appropriate recipient of evacuees in the event of a PI.)

- If scenario occurs outside of the context of Tripwire Six (above), the Embassy MAO in coordination with its sub-sections will implement the following procedures:
- Identify suitable temporary lodging arrangements for the evacuees.
- Establish procedures for the evacuees to receive administrative services such as cashing checks, use of commissary, access to the Medical Unit, filing travel vouchers, etc.
- Designate sponsors for the evacuees.
- Assist school age children to enroll into temporary classes in appropriate school if the evacuation period is extended beyond two weeks.

- If scenario occurs within the context of Tripwire Six (above), incoming personnel should be diverted to other points. Incoming personnel who have already arrived in Peru will be placed on ordered departure.

124. (U) SCENARIO TWO

Reported saturation of available medical facilities in

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Lima/Peru.

- Response assumes Scenario Two takes place within the context of PI outbreak in Lima or outside Lima with cases transported to Lima. Many dependents and staff likely will have already been evacuated. Emergency Action Committee meets to discuss next steps, which could include:

- Staff reduction at NMRC-D-Iquitos and NMRC-D-Callao. Recall to Lima of PCV and NAS employees.

- Request ordered departure of non-emergency personnel and dependents with authorized departure of designated emergency staff on a case-by-case basis. (Note: Ordered or authorized departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.)

125. (U) SCENARIO THREE

International commercial flights departing Peru are severely curtailed or halted or are fully booked.

- Emergency Action Committee meets to discuss next steps, which could include:

- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, all others remain home (administrative leave).

- HU and designated EAC members meet with school administrators to review advisability of closing the schools.

- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and water.

- Consider social restrictions (restricting social events/gatherings, sporting events, etc.)

- Evacuation of non-emergency personnel and dependents out of Peru via commercial airlift, via U.S. military flights out through Lima, or by sea. (Note: Both Air and Sea are viable methods for conducting an evacuation of non-combatants. Military assets, however, are not pre-positioned or "waiting" to execute; they would have to be diverted from support of combat operations in Iraq. Once the COM or SECSTATE requests assistance from the SECDEF or CDR USSOUTHCOM, the method of conducting the evacuation will be decided by military mission planners once the requirements are actually known - response time, number of personnel to be evacuated, destination, availability of resources, location, etc. Based on an air evacuation, negotiations by State for the destination would have to be conducted. The most likely choice would be the Southern United States, or if travel to the U.S. is restricted, Santiago or Bogot. Evacuation of non-emergency personnel and dependents by sea is outlined in the Emergency Action Plan. Any evacuation related to avian influenza, however, must take into account possible Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible Chilean and/or U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.

126. (U) SCENARIO FOUR

A Mission staff member, a student, teacher, or other staff

at a school used by Mission families is suspected of having contracted avian influenza.

- At the request of the HU, can offer limited testing of Mission personnel and family members. All samples would be sent to the U.S. for confirmation, but NMRCDC can provide a reliable although non-FDA approved result within a few hours of receiving the sample.

- If patient is a Mission staff member or dependent, HU begins therapeutic treatment of the patient with Tamiflu.

- Home quarantine of patient and anyone who has had direct contact with patient.

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- Per State 183776 (10/05/2005) The HU will consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for persons required to be in direct contact with potentially infected persons. In general, treatment with Tamiflu will be restricted to those who become ill rather than for prevention in persons without symptoms. "This strategy includes withholding medication from asymptomatic close contacts of those with known illness, such as family members, until clinical symptoms appear." In addition, American citizens not eligible for DOS medical program benefits, non-ICASS contributors, and those outside the official community will not have access to these Tamiflu stockpiles.

POC AND DOD PERSONNEL

127. (U) All DOD personnel are under COM authority. The individuals with Top Secret clearances who will update the Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) are ARSO Kory Hammond and ECONoff Howell Howard.

STRUBLE